WILEY Modern Security Analysis: Understanding Wall Street Fundamentals: 861

I really wanted to like this book. I really wanted to get something from it. I read the whole thing.This book is pretentiously written and spends half the pages talking about how their philosophy is differerent from Graham and Dodd.I never for one second got the feeling that the author wanted me to learn something. When I read Graham and Dodd, Greenblatt, Carlisle... I get the feeling that they wanted me to learn something, or they were exploring something. Marty Whitman's book gives none of that. Skip it move onto the next oneThe sentence structure is awful. The paragraphs never end. There is no point to half the paragraphs. I have to re-read everything 3x to try to understand what is being said --- and most of the time it is nothing.There are no case studies to speak of. Save youreself the time.

This book arrived in prestine condition. It is different version of Security Analysis, from Graham & Dodd and Cottle.

bought the book but it awaits reading.

I've previously read the author's 2008 book "Distressed Investing." Being aware of Mr. Whitman's reputation for said type of investing, and the title of the book, I was expecting a book that discussed the various metrics and measurements that he employs in those types of situations. Instead of his interpretation of how to deconstruct financial statements, what's presented is an overview of the paradigm the author uses for investments.PROs:- His criticisms on the EMH, MCT and MPT are spot on.- Rather than simply taking the perspective of an investor buying investments on the open market (Outside Passive Minority Investors, or OPMI), the authors present the points of view from several other security owners, such as senior secured creditors and subordinate debenture holders.- Uses Net Asset Value (Book value, more or less) and its growth as a measurement of value, which most authors of late seem to overlook.- A good amount of time is spent on distressed investing.- Details why (numerous times) diversification is simply a ("poor") substitute for knowledge, judgment, and analysis. For the active investor, they successfully explain why a concentrated portfolio is much better than an diversified one. Basically, if you're going to be "diversified" in your stock selection (More than 15-20 individual equities), you're better off buying a low-cost index fund.CONs:- My biggest problem with the book is that it's simply too repetitive. I don't mean from materials previously published in the authors other books, but identical paragraphs found in one chapter after another in this book. For instance, the EXACT SAME half-page example for Society Corp. and how it worked out as a "resource conversion" is presented in THREE different chapters!- Having read both Graham and Dodd's "Security Analysis" recently, and the "Intelligent Investor" twice, I'm not sure that the authors and I were reading the same books. He accuses G&D of having a short-term outlook for market prices, and being unconcerned with management. While Graham's recommended holding period of 2 years is arguably shorter than the authors, the accusation of G&D being more concerned with short-term price fluctuations than long-term outlook is baffling.- The authors restate many times how they prefer a bottom-up approach (focusing on the individual company, indifferent to macroeconomic conditions) to investing rather than a top-down (using macroeconomic conditions to aid in deciding which investments to buy), which is fine. However, in spite of this point being repeatedly made, there's a whole chapter on how modern macroeconomists (Keynes, Hayek, and Friedman) have gotten it wrong. It's not that I agree or disagree with their points, but if we're supposed to ignore the macroeconomic conditions, why bother with discussing why economists are right or wrong?- This is perhaps what annoyed me the most about the book: Besides the recommendation of buying stocks at least a 20% discount to their NAV, and to ensure that they can grow their NAV by at least 10% compounded annually for the intended holding period, that have a "strong financial position," there is almost NO discussion on quantitative factors of what makes up a "strong financial position." Considering the authors are noted for distressed investing, why not mention what indicates a troublesome coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest expense)? What is an usually large amount of total debt-to-EBITDA? Complete letdown.- Building on that, on the topic of distressed credit instruments, the authors use vague phrases like "we figured there would be a 75% chance that the debt holders wouldn't want to participate in Chapter 11." Thanks, but without knowing HOW you came to conclude there was a 75% chance, the statement adds nothing of value. Also, when discussing how creditors can profit from Chapter 11 by exchanging debt for new equity, there's no material on how the authors determine whether or not the value of the new equity will be greater or less than in relation to the price of the current debt.- Despite being "Modern" security analysis, many of the examples the authors give are from the 1960s and 1970s. I know that finance hasn't changed much since then, but some more recent case studies would've been more helpful.In short, the book's title of "Modern Security Analysis" is misleading. Rather, it should be "Modern Business Perspectives." If you're looking for a solid operating paradigm for investing in distressed securities, this is the book for you. If you're interested in specific numbers on what to look for and what to avoid when engaging in this type of investing, look elsewhere.

AAA