Birds of Prey: Boeing vs. Airbus: A Battle for the Skies Paperback – April 14, 1998

I have been an aviation enthusiast for most of my life. The commercial aviation world is particular dear to me. Although I am but an amateur follower of the industry, I am fairly certain that I understand it better than does Mr. Lynn.First, allow me to report on the unforgivable mistakes in his book. Lynn's work is rife with typos and spelling mistakes (in a revised edition!). It is uncoordinated in many places and reads as though different sections were, hurriedly, written at different times and then given to an editor to splice together. "Hodgepodge" best describes Mr. Lynn's style.Also unforgivable are the numerous mistakes of fact and gross misrepresentations to be found in "Birds of Prey." To be blunt, the B-17 was not a commercial failure (although, due to the hodgepodge nature of the book, I'm not actually certain Mr. Lynn really means to say this). The Boeing 707 was developed first as a military tanker and then as an airliner (using government-owned tooling, a "subsidy" Lynn totally misses, all the while slinging barbs at Airbus for receiving similar government aid). By stating that, because he was a lawyer by training, Bill Allen (father of the Boeing 747, among other aircraft) was not, and could not have been, an "airplane guy," is ludicrous. Bill Gates never finished his computer studies, so perhaps it follows that he can't be a "computer guy."There is a regulation, which covers all twin-engined commercial flights over water, called ETOPS. This well-known rule states that twins cannot be certified to operate water routes unless manufacturers can show that the aircraft can safely remain aloft for 2-3 hours following an engine failure. It seems Mr. Lynn's "research" (more on this later) didn't uncover the ETOPS criteria for twin certification. If he had known about it, he would have seen that his explanation for the slow sales of the A300 and A310 is rather silly. Another mistake of fact becomes blatantly clear when Mr. Lynn calls the Boeing 757 a made over 727. He argues that because both share the same fuselage (actually just the cross section) the 757 is merely warmed-over 1960's technology. If he really understood what he was saying, he would have to say the 757 is actually based on 1940's technology. What Lynn misses is that the 707, the 720, the 727 and the 737 all share the same fuselage, albeit in different lengths and with certain modifications. The 757 uses the cross section (dimensions) of the 707 fuselage but the materials and construction techniques used today differ greatly from those employed 40, 30 or even 10 years ago. To label the 757 a re-winged 727, then, is "nonsense on stilts," to quote a British jurist. Never mind the fuselage and wings, the fact that the 727 has three engines, all mounted on the tail, and the 757 is a twin with wing-mounted engines underscores that these are different aircraft. The 757 even looks different from all other 707 derived aircraft (just look at the contours around the cockpit).Of course, it goes without saying (but I will say it anyway) that the 727 and the Airbus A300 never competed with one another. The A300 could be used to replace 727's (the original trunk-liner on the American hub-and-spoke airport system) as passenger loads increased, but one does not pit a 160 seat aircraft against a 250-300 seat aircraft. A parallel would be to try and sell a bus to a mini-van customer.Mr. Lynn contradicts himself in many places, and even (in one case) on the same page. On page 186 he states that, "Boeing was sitting on a pile of cash...[and to thwart a hostile takeover bid] some of the spare $3 billion could be used to buy back its own shares; an expensive and curious manoeuver for a cash hungry firm." It seems to me that a $3 billion bank balance put Boeing squarely into a cash surplus, not a crunch, and to call a move to halt a 1980's style hostile takeover bid "curious" is itself curious.Going back to research, while the author undertook several personal interviews, the bulk of his research was done using secondary sources. Many of those are not scholarly and can best be describe as general aviation or business books. This is an issue because Lynn uses footnotes, which implies that his book is to be taken as a piece of well-research literature.I believe that the book's subtitle is deceiving. I bought "Birds of Prey" because I thought I was getting a blow-by-blow account of the "Boeing vs. Airbus" struggle and that I was going to read about a "Battle for the Skies." In truth, we don't get to the real battle until page 175 (of 234 text pages). There is an account of the introduction of the A300 and A310, and the genesis of the A320, before page 175 but the author goes to lengths to reassure the reader that these Airbus products did not faze Boeing in the least. We can hardly call this era in aerospace history a "battle."Finally, "landing slots" are not dependent upon aircraft size (they are time slots, when aircraft are permitted to enter the airport's pattern to land). And, just a note, on the cover there are two aircraft facing each other, head to head (as if to imply a battle of sorts is going on between them). That's an interesting marketing ploy for this book. Unfortunately, both airplanes are Boeing 737s.Colin Saunders

This work on Boeing (USA) and Airbus (Europe or what they call UE) competition is undeniably compelling. Unfortunately some faults about technical aspects make it a little bit incomplete. Anyway, once the book has caught the reader attention (forgiving the mistakes) it is hard to throw off its spell.A precious facet is the historical reconstruction of political and economical process, describing the post war crises of aeronautical companies in Europe in the civil market. Emerging from the war, european countries were eager to start a new life. The aeronautical skill (grown during belligerent times) was put to work in leading program like the Comet, Caravelle, Trident, BAC 1-11, etc. . Unfortunately management and political control were so conservative that they were unable to drive the new technology evolution in full swing. So each european State basically never developed a sound industrial strategy (i.e. for shortsighted nationalistic interest). The nemesys of national designs and firms (as autonomous entities in the market) led to the pooling of energies called Airbus. This part of the book is quite organic and it is a clever description of cut-throat struggle with another arab phoenix like Boeing (the company emerging from internal US competition).Many technical flaws appear from the narrative, two are important for the plot. First,Boeing 707 project was a masterpiece being the first design that made civil aeronautical "know-how" to grow fully (so far for DC-8 and Convair 880). Initially it was developed as a strategic tanker and, of course, research & development funding was available to boost the design during the cold war. Many advanced technologies were put to fruition from research centers (federal or private) and a "full steam ahead" was given to any study capable of making them affordable. Airbus never got the same opportunity. Second point, the airliners market is divided in segmets and even if new technologies are not enough cheap to change aicraft shapes, the quest for more efficient planes compels consolidated knowledge to mature completely. So 2engines Boeing 757 is the 727 replacement because they were designed to fulfill the same segment (according to lower unit cost per machine and equipment, in order to respect more restrictive regulations). To be more precise each segment is divided into specialized sectors; each manifacturer design a basic adaptable project for a segment, then engineers "customize" the plane for a particular requirements (just look at the Boeing 777, initially developed in "A" version, reveallingly dubbed "A" market, and in the "B" version or "B" market).In the end lack of aviation expertise is quite limiting in this bold work, compromising a basically sound effort. Nevertheless this is an admirable attempt to reveal the insights of the most terrible struggle between two major corporate conglomerates in airliners industry.

I bought the book hoping for insight into the boeing vs. airbus story, the sub-title of the book. Unfortunately, it started much earlier in the early days of civilian aviation. Though I feel the insider perspective to the industry, the books is pretty dry reading.The last part looked hopeful when Lynn began to get into the direct competition between Europe and the US over jet sales, but so much has changed since the book was written almost 10 years ago. Airbus now has the 380, Boeing is working on its new plane. It's quite dated now and not worth the time. Glad I picked it up on sale.

Sometimes I felt that I was reading a thriller which was good, because I had to read the book for educational purposes. Problematic about the book is that the author is taking a very casual approach on the matter, which lets me wonder if I can trust the analysis presented in the book completely. If he would have sticked more with the bare facts, I might have more of a trust in his conclusions. Especially in the beginning, I felt that he was taking too much of an American view on the battle between Airbus and Boeing. I changed my opinion a little bit on this towards the end, but I still believe that his choice of expressions should be more conservative and serious. What is good about the book, is that it shows that the airline industry is full of politics and how the Europeans have developed a successful industry out of nothing.